Leakage resilient codes (LRCs) are probabilistic encoding schemes that guarantee message hiding even under some bounded leakage on the codeword. We introduce the notion of fully leakage resilient codes (FLRCs), where the adversary can leak λ0 bits from the encoding process, namely, the message and the randomness involved during the encoding process. In addition the adversary can as usual leak from the codeword. We give a simulation-based definition requiring that the adversary's leakage from the encoding process and the codeword can be simulated given just λ0 bits of leakage from the message. For λ0 = 0 our new simulationbased notion is equivalent to the usual game-based definition. A FLRC would be interesting in its own right and would be useful in building other leakage-resilient primitives in a composable manner. Unfortunately, we give a fairly general impossibility result for FLRCs in the popular split-state model, where the codeword is broken into independent parts and where the leakage occurs independently on the parts. We show that if the leakage is allowed to be any poly-time function of the secret and if collision-resistant hash functions exist, then there is no FLRC for the split-state model. The result holds when the message length is at least linear in the security parameter. We can extend the impossibility result to FLRCs with constant-length messages under assumptions related to differing-input obfuscation. These results show that it is highly unlikely that we can build FLRCs for the split-state model when the leakage can be any poly-time function of the secret state. We then give two feasibility results for weaker models. First, we show that for NC 0 -bounded leakage from the randomness and arbitrary poly-time leakage from the parts of the codeword the inner-product construction proposed by Daví et al. (SCN'10) and successively improved by Dziembowski and Faust (ASIACRYPT'11) is a FLRC for the split-state model. Second, we provide a compiler from any LRC to a FLRC in the common reference string model where the leakage on the encoding comes from a fixed leakage family of small cardinality. In particular, this compiler applies to the split-state model but also to other models.
Introduction
Leakage-resilient codes (LRCs) (also known as leakage-resilient storages) allow to store safely a secret information in a physical memory that may leak some side-channel information. Since their introduction (see Davì et al. [DDV10] ) they have found many applications either by their own or as building blocks for other leakage and tamper resilient primitives. To mention some, Dziembowski and Faust [DF11] proposed an efficient and continuous leakage-resilient identification scheme and a continuous leakageresilient CCA2 cryptosystem, while Andrychowicz et al. [AMP15] proposed a practical leakage-resilient LPN-based version of the Lapin protocol (see Heyse et al. [HKL + 12]) both relying on LRCs based on the inner-product extractor. LRC found many applications also in the context of non-malleable codes (see Dziembowski et al. [DPW10] ), which, roughly speaking, can be seen as their tamper-resilience counterpart. Faust et al. [FMVW14] showed a non-malleable code based on LRC, Aggarwal et al. [ADKO15] proposed a construction of leakage and tamper resilient code and Faust et al. [FMNV14] showed continuous non-malleable codes based on LRC [FMNV14] (see also Jafargholi and Wichs [JW15] ).
The security requirement of LRC states that given two messages, arbitrarily but bounded length leakage on the encoding of them is indistinguishable. Ideally, a good LRC should be resilient to a leakage that can be much longer than the size of the message protected, however, to get such strong guarantee some restriction on the class of leakage allowed must be set. Intuitively, any scheme where the adversary can compute the decoding function as leakage cannot be secure. A way to fix this problem is to consider randomly chosen LRCs. As showed in [DDV10] , and successively improved in [FMVW14, JW15] , for any fixed set of leakage functions, there exists a family of efficiently computable codes such that with high probability a code from this family is leakage resilient. From a cryptographic prospective, the results known in this direction can be interpreted as being in the "common reference string" model, where the leakage class is set and, then, the LRC is sampled.
Another way, more relevant for our paper, is to consider the split-state model [DP08, HL11] where the message is encoded in two (or more) codewords and the leakage happens adaptively but independently from each codewords, thus the decoding function cannot automatically be part of the allowed leakage, which opens the possibility of constructing a LRC.
It is easy to see that the encoding algorithm must be randomized, otherwise two fixed messages can be easily distinguished. However, the security of LRC does not give any guarantee when there is leakage from the randomness used in the encoding process. In other words, while the encoded message can be stored in a leaky device the encoding must be executed in a completely leak-free environment. A stronger flavour of security where we allow leakage from the encoding process is usually called fully leakage resilience.
Our Contributions
We generalize the notion of LRC to the setting of fully leakage resilience. Roughly speaking, a fully leakage-resilient code (FLRC) hides information about the secret message even when the adversary leaked information during the encoding process. Our contributions can be summarized as follow:
1. We provide a simulation-based definition of fully leakage-resilient codes. The definition postulates that for any adversary leaking λ 0 bit from the encoding process and λ 1 bits from the codewords there exists a simulator which provide a view that is indistinguishable. Our definition is, in some sense, the minimal one suitable for the fully leakage resilience setting. As a sanity check, we show that our new notion is implied by the indistinguishability-based definition of [DDV10] for λ 0 = 0. 2. We show that there does not exist an efficient coding scheme in the split-state model that is a fully leakage resilient code if the leakage function is allowed to be any poly-time function. Our result holds for coding schemes where the messages length are at least linear in the security parameter and under the sole assumption that collision-resistant hash functions exist. We can generalize the impossibility result to the case of constant-length messages under the much stronger assumption that differing-input obfuscation exists (see [ABG + 13,BCP14]). 3. We provide two feasibility results for weaker models. We show that, if the leakage from the randomness is computable by bounded-depth constant fan-in circuits (i.e. NC 0 -computable leakage), the inner-product extractor LRC of [DDV10] is fully leakage resilient. We show a compiler from any LRC to a fully leakage resilient code in the common reference string model for any fixed leakagefrom-the-encoding family of small cardinality.
Simulation-based Security. Consider the naive fully leakage-resilient extension of the indistinguishability-based security definition of LRC. Roughly speaking, the adversary plays against a challenger and it can leak λ 0 > 0 bits from a random string ω ←$ {0, 1} * , successively the adversary sends to the challenger two messages m 0 , m 1 , the challenger chooses a random bit b and encodes the message m b using the randomness ω. After this, the adversary gets access to leakage from the codewords. We show an easy attack on this definition. The attacker can compute, via leakage function on the randomness, the encoding of both m 0 and m 1 and find a coordinate in which the two codewords differ, successively, by leaking from the codeword only one bit, it can check whether m 0 or m 1 has been encoded. The problem is that the indistinguishability-based security definition for fully leakage resilient codes sketched above concentrates on preserving, in presence of leakage on the randomness, the same security guarantees as the (standard) leakage resilient definition. However, the ability of leaking before and after the challenge generation, as shown for many other cryptographic primitive, gives to the adversary too much power.
Following the leakage-tolerant paradigm introduced by Bitansky et al.
[BCH12], we instead consider a simulation-based notion of security. The definition postulates that for any adversary leaking λ 0 bits from the encoding process and λ 1 bits from the codewords there exists a simulator which provide a view that is indistinguishable. Namely, the adversary chooses one input message and forwards it to the challenger of the security game. After that the adversary can, sequentially, leak from the encoding process and from the codeword. The job of the simulator is to produce an indistinguishable view of the leakage oracles to the adversary, given only leakage oracle access to the message. It is not hard to see that, without any help, the task would be impossible. Since an adversary could in particular leak bits of the input message, if the input message is randomly chosen the simulator trivially cannot provide an indistinguishable view. The simulator can leak up to λ 0 (1 + γ) bits from the message for a "slack parameter" γ 0. The idea is that some information about the encoded message can unavoidably leak from the encoding process, however the amount of information about the message, even after have seen the leakage on the codeword, does not exceed to much the bound on the leakage on the encoding process. The slack parameter is often considered as a reasonable weakening of the model in the context of fully leakage resilience (see for example [GJS11,FNV14,HL11,NVZ14]), we include it in our model to make the impossibility results stronger. For the feasibility results we will instead ignore it.
The impossibility results. We give an impossibility result for FLRCs in the split-state model. Recall that, in the split state model, the codeword is divided in two parts which are stored in two independent leaky devices. Each leakage query can be any poly-time function of the data stored in one of the parts.
Here we give the intuition behind the attacker. For simplicity let us set the slack parameter γ equal to 0. In our attack we leak from the encoding process a hash of each of the two parts of the codeword. The leakage function takes the message and the randomness, runs the encoding algorithm to compute the two parts L and R (the left part and the right part) and leaks two hash values h l = h(L) and h r = h(R). Then we use a succinct argument of knowledge systems to also leak an argument of knowledge of preimages L and R of h l and h r for which it holds that (L, R) decodes to m. Let λ 0 be the length of the two hashes and the succinct argument. After this the message can be encoded. The adversary uses its access to leak from L to leak, in sequence, several succinct arguments of knowledge of L such that h l = h(L). Similarly the adversary uses its access to leak from R to leak, in sequence, several succinct arguments of knowledge of R such that h r = h(R). By setting λ 1 λ 0 we can within the leakage bound λ 1 on L and R leak 17λ 0 succinct arguments of knowledge of L and R. If the code is secure there exists a simulator which can simulate the leakage of h l and h r and all the arguments given at most λ 0 bits of leakage on m. Since the arguments are accepting in the real world and the simulator is assumed to be good it follows that the simulated arguments are accepting too with probability close to 1. Since the simulator has access to only λ 0 bits of leakage on m it follows that for one of the 17λ 0 simulated arguments produced by the simulator it uses the leakage oracle on m with probability at most 1 4 . This means that with probability 3 4 the simulator is not even using the leakage oracle to simulate this argument, so if we remove the access to leakage from m the argument will still be acceptable with probability close to 3 4 . Hence if the argument systems has knowledge error just 1 2 we can extract L from this argument with probability close to 1 4 . Similarly we can extract from one of the arguments of knowledge of R the value R with probability close to 1 4 . By collision resistance and soundness of the first argument leaked from the encoding process it follows that (L, R) decodes to m. This means that we can extract from the simulator the message m with probability negligibly close to 1 16 while using only λ 0 bits of leakage on m. If m is uniformly random and just λ 0 + 6 bits long, this is a contradiction, as there is 6 bits on min-entropy on m after leaking λ 0 bits on m and hence m cannot be guessed with probability better than 2 −6 .
Similar proof techniques have been used already by Nielsen et al. [NVZ13] to prove a connection between leakage resilience and adaptive security and recently by Ostrovsky et al. [OPV15] to prove an impossibility result for certain flavors of leakage-resilient zero-knowledge proof systems. The way we apply this type of argument here is novel. It is in particular a new idea to use many arguments of knowledge in sequence to sufficient restrict the simulators ability to leak from its leakage oracle in one of the proofs.
The proposed attack needs to leak at least a collision resistant hash function of the codeword. On the other hand, the definition of FLR makes sense only when the leakage parameter λ 0 is strictly smaller than the size of the message, therefore the length of the message needs to be super-logarithmic in the security parameter. Thus the technique cannot be used directly to give an impossibility result for constant-length message FLRC. We can overcome this problem relying on the concept of Predictable ZAP (PZAP) recently proposed by Faonio et al. [FNV15] . A PZAP is an extremely succinct 2-message argument of knowledge where the prover can first see the challenge from the verifier and then decide the instance. This allows the attacker to implement the first check by just leaking a constant-length argument that the hashes of the two parts of the codeword are well formed (without actually leaking the hash values) and then, successively, leak the hash values from the codeword and check the validity of the argument. PZAP are shown to imply extractable witness encryption (see Boyle et al. [BCP14] ) and therefore the "implausibility" result of Garg et al. [GGHW14] applies. We interpret our second impossibility result as an evidence that constant-length FLRC are hard to construct as such a code would not only make diO implausible, but it would prove diO impossible under the only assumption that collision-resistant hash functions exists.
The feasibility results. The ability to leak collision resistant hash functions of the randomness is necessary for the impossibility result. The natural question that follows is: If we restrict the leakage class so that no collision resistance hash function can be computed as leakage on the randomness, can we find a coding scheme that is fully leakage resilient? We answer this question affirmatively. We consider the class NC 0 of constant-depth constant fan-in circuits and we show that the LRC based on the innerproduct extractor (and more general LRCs where there is an NC 0 function that maps the randomness to the codeword) are fully leakage resilient. The intuition is that NC 0 leakage is not powerful enough to break all the "independence" between the two parts of the codeword. Technically, we are able to cast every leakage query on the randomness into two slightly bigger and independent leakage queries on the two parts of the codeword. Notice that collision resistant hash functions cannot be computed by NC 0 circuits. This is necessary. In fact, proving a similar result for a bigger complexity class automatically implies a lower bound on the complexity of computing either a collision resistant hash function or an argument of knowledge. Intuitively, this provides a strong evidence that is hard to construct FLRC even for bounded classes of leakage.
Another important property that we exploit in the impossibility result is that, given access to the leakage oracle on the randomness, we can compute the codeword. A second path to avoid the impossibility results is to consider weaker models of security where this is not permitted. We point out that the schemes proposed by [DDV10,FMVW14,JW15] in the common reference string model can be easily proved to be fully leakage resilient. Inspired by the above results we provide a compiler that maps any LRC to FLRC for any fixed leakage-from-the-encoding family F of small cardinality. Notice that the bound is on the cardinality of the leakage class and not on its complexity (in principle, the leakage class could contain collision resistance hash functions).
We remark that the definition of FLRC already assumes a CRS (this to include in our model the result of Liu and Lysyanskaya [LL12]). The key point is that, by fixing F ahead (namely, before the common reference string is sampled) and because of the small cardinality, the adversary cannot make "depend" the leakage on the encoding from the common reference string, disabling therefore the computation of the encoded word as leakage on the encoding process.
Technically, we use a result of Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] which proves that for any fixed leakage class F a t-wise independent hash function (the parameter t depends on the cardinality of F) is a deterministic extractor with high probability. The proof mostly follows the template given in [FMVW14] .
Related Work
Cryptographic schemes are designed under the assumption that the adversary cannot learn any information about the secret key. However, side-channel attacks (see [Koc96,KJJ99,QS01]) have showed that this assumption does not always hold. These attacks have motivated the design of leakage-resilient cryptosystems which remain secure even against adversaries that may obtain partial information about the secret state. Starting from the groundbreaking result of Micali and Reyzin [MR04] , successively either gradually stronger or different models have been consider (see for example [ADW09,DP08,FRR + 10,NS09]). Simulation-based definitions in the context of leakage-resilient cryptography were also adopted in the case of zero-knowledge proof (see [AGP14,GJS11,Pan14]) public-key encryption (see [HL11] ) and signature schemes (see [NVZ14] ). As mentioned already, our proof technique for the impossibility result is inspired by the works of Nielsen et al. [NVZ13] and Ostrovsky et al. [OPV15] , however, part of the analysis diverges, and instead resembles an information theoretic argument already known in leakage-resilient cryptography (see for example [ADW09, FNV14, KV09] ).
In [FMNV15] the authors present a RAM model of computation where a CPU is connected to some constant number of memories, paralleling the split-state model that we use here. The memories and buses are assumed to be leaky, but the CPU is assumed to be leakage free. Besides leakage, the paper also shows how to handle tampering, like moving around codewords in the memories. They show how to use a leakage-resilient and tamper-resilient code to securely compute on this platform. In each step the CPU will read from the disks a number of codewords, decode these, do a computation on the plaintext, re-encode the results and write the codewords back in the memories. One should wonder if it is possible to get a similar result for the more realistic model where there is a little leakage from the CPU? It is clear that if the CPU can leak, then it can also leak from the plaintexts it is working on. This can be handled by having the computation that is done on the plaintexts being leakage resilient in itself. The challenging part is then to show that the leakage from the CPU during re-encoding of the results to be stored in the memories can be simulated given just a little leakage on the results themeselves. This would in particular require that the code is fully leakage-resilient in the sense we define in this paper. Our negative results therefore do not bode well for this proof strategy. On the other hand, our positive results open up the possibility of tolerating some simple leakage from the CPU or getting a result for weaker models, like the random oracle model. Note, however, that the code would have to be tamper-resilient in addition to being fully leakage resilient, so there still seem to be significant obstacles towards proving such a result.
Roadmap
In Section 2 we introduce the necessary notation for probability and cryptographic tools we make use of. In Section 3 we provide the simulation-based definition for Fully Leakage-Resilient Codes. In Section 4 we state and prove the main impossibility result for linear-size message spaces. In Section 4.1 we sketch the second impossibility result for constant-size message space, the full proof is deferred in Appendix B. In Section 5 we provide the two feasibility results, specifically, in Section 5.1 we give a FLR code for the class NC 0 and in Section 5.2 we give a compiler from Leakage-Resilient Codes to Fully Leakage-Resilient Codes for any fixed class of small cardinality.
Preliminaries

Notation and Probability Preliminaries
We let N denote the naturals and R denote the reals. For a, b ∈ R, we let [a, b] = {x ∈ R : a ≤ x ≤ b}; for a ∈ N we let [a] = {1, 2, . . . , a}. If x is a string, we denote its length by |x|; if X is a set, |X | represents the number of elements in X . When x is chosen randomly in X , we write x ←$ X . When A is an algorithm, we write y ← A(x) to denote a run of A on input x and output y; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and A(x; r) denotes a run of A on input x and randomness r. An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) if A is allowed to use random choices and for any input x ∈ {0, 1} * and randomness r ∈ {0, 1} * the computation of A(x; r) terminates in at most poly(|x|) steps.
Let κ be a security parameter. A function negl is called negligible in κ (or simply negligible) if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in κ.
For two ensembles
We simply write X c ≈ Y when there exists a negligible function such that X c ≈ Y. Similarly, we write X ≈ Y (statistical indistinguishability), meaning that every unbounded distinguisher has (κ) advantage in distinguishing X and Y.
Given two ensembles X and Y such that X ≈ Y the following holds:
We recall the notion of (average) conditional min-entropy. We adopt the definition given in [ADW09] , where the authors generalize the notion of conditional min-entropy to interactive predictors that participate in some randomized experiment E. The conditional min-entropy of random variable X given any randomized experiment E is defined as follows:
where the maximum is taken over all predictors without any requirement on efficiency. Note that w.l.o.g. the predictor B is deterministic, in fact, we can de-randomize B by hardwiring the random coins that maximize its outcome. Sometimes we write H ∞ (X|Y ) for a random variable Y , in this case we mean the average conditional min-entropy of X given the random experiment that gives Y as input to the predictor.
Given a string X ∈ {0, 1} * and a value λ ∈ N let the oracle O X λ (·) be the leakage oracle that accepts as input functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . defined as circuits and outputs f 1 (X), f 2 (X), . . . under the restriction that
We recall here a lemma of Alwen et al.
[ADW09] that we make use of. Lemma 1. For any random variable X and for any experiment E with oracle access to O X λ (·), consider the experiment E which is the same as E except that the predictor does not have oracle access to O X λ (·).
We recall a lemma from Bellare and Rompel [BR94] .
Lemma 2. Let t 4 be an even integer. Suppose X 1 , . . . , X n are t-wise independent random variables taking values in [0, 1]. Let X := i X i and define µ := E[X] to be the expectation of the sum. Then,
Cryptographic Primitives
Arguments of Knowledge. Our results are based on the existence of round-efficient interactive argument systems. We follow some of the notation of Wee [Wee05]. The knowledge soundness definition is taken from [OPV15] . A public-coin argument system (P (w), V )(x) with round complexity ρ(κ) is fully described by the tuple of ppt algorithms (Prove, Judge) where: 
The value ν(·) is called the completeness error and the value s(·) is called the knowledge error. We say (P, V ) has perfect completeness if ν = 0. The communication complexity of the argument system is the total length of all messages exchanged during an execution; the round complexity is the total number of exchanged messages. We write AoK ν,s (ρ(κ), λ(κ)) to denote interactive argument on knowledge systems with completeness error ν, knowledge error s, round-complexity ρ(κ) and communication complexity λ(κ). Sometimes we also write λ(κ) = λ P (κ) + λ V (κ) to differentiate between the communication complexity of the prover and of the verifier. We say (P, V ) is succinct if λ(κ) is poly-logarithmic in the length of the witness and the statement being proven. , is an argument of knowledge system with two messages only and where the prover message can be of constant size. Specifically, we make use of Predictable ZAPs, namely two-message adaptive-sound arguments of knowledge. Such protocols are fully specified by a tuple of three ppt algorithms Π = (Chall, Resp, Predict) as described below: -V samples (c, tp) ←$ Chall(1 κ ) and sends c to P .
Instantiations
(Notice that the generated tuple is independent of the instance.) -P samples a ←$ Resp(1 κ , x, w, c) and sends a to V . -V computes b := Predict(tp, x) and accepts if a = b, else rejects.
Roughly speaking, the adaptive knowledge-soundness of a Predictable ZAP postulates that the malicious prover can selects instances adaptively as function of the challenge c. The knowledge property states that for any adversary succeeding in the experiment with some non-trivial probability, there exists a knowledge extractor that outputs valid witnesses for the instances produced by the malicious prover with roughly the same probability. We give the security definition in Appendix B.
Collision Resistant Hash Functions. Let (Gen CRH , Eval CRH ) be a tuple of ppt algorithms such that upon input 1 κ the algorithm Gen outputs an evaluation key h and upon inputs h and a string x ∈ {0, 1} * the deterministic algorithm Eval CRH outputs a string y ∈ {0, 1} CRH (κ) . We shorten the notation by writing h(x) for Eval CRH (h, x).
Definition 2. A tuple (Eval CRH , Gen CRH ) is a collision-resistant hash function (family) with output length CRH (κ) if for any non-uniform polynomial time collision-finder adversary B coll there exists a negligible function negl such that the following holds:
For simplicity we consider the model of non-uniform polynomial time adversaries. Note, however, that our results hold also if we consider the model ppt adversaries.
Definition
In this section we give the definition of Fully Leakage Resilient Codes. The definition given is specialized for the 2-split-state model, we adopt this definition instead of a more general one for simplicity. The results given in Section 4 can be adapted to hold for the more general k-split model (see Remark 1) . LRCs of [DDV10,FMNV14,JW15] in the common reference string model can be proved fully-leakage resilience (see Section 5). Therefore the syntax given allows the scheme to depends on a common reference string to include the scheme of [LL12].
An (α, β)-split-coding scheme is a tuple Σ = (Gen, Enc, Dec) of ppt algorithms with the following syntax:
-Gen on input 1 κ outputs a common reference string crs.
-Enc on inputs crs and a message m ∈ M κ outputs a tuple (L, R) ∈ C κ × C κ ; -Dec is a deterministic algorithm that on inputs crs and a codeword (L, R) ∈ C κ × C κ decodes to m ∈ M κ .
A split-coding scheme is correct if for any κ and any m ∈ M κ we have Pr crs,re [Dec(crs, Enc(crs, m; r e )) = m] = 1. In what follows, whenever it is clear from the context, we will omit the security parameter κ so we will write α, β instead of α(κ), β(κ), etc. Given an (α, β)-split-coding scheme Σ, for any A = (A 0 , A 1 ) and any function λ 0 , λ 1 let Real λ 0 ,λ 1 A,Σ (κ) be the following experiment: By overloading the notation, we let Real λ 0 ,λ 1 A,Σ be also the tuple of random variables that describes the view of A in the experiment:
Given an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ), a simulator S and a slack parameter γ(κ) such that 0 As we did with Real λ 0 ,λ 1 A,Σ we denote with Ideal λ 0 ,λ 1 A,S,γ also the tuple of random variables that describe the view of A in the experiment. To mark the distinction between the real experiment and ideal experiment we upper script the "simulated" components of the ideal experiment with a tilde, namely:
Given a class of leakage functions Λ we say that an adversary is Λ-bounded if it submits only queries (rand, f ) where the function f ∈ Λ.
Definition 3 (Simulation-based Λ-fully leakage resilient code). An (α, β)-split-coding scheme is said to be (Λ, λ 0 , λ 1 , )-FLR-sim-secure with slack parameter 0 γ < α/λ 0 − 1 if for any ppt adversary A that is Λ-bounded there exists a ppt simulator S:
Let P /poly be the set of all polynomial-sized circuits.
Definition 4 (Simulation-based fully leakage resilient code). An (α, β)-split-coding scheme is said to be (λ 0 , λ 1 , )-FLR-sim-secure with slack parameter γ if it is (P /poly , λ 0 , λ 1 , )-FLR-sim-secure with slack parameter γ. We simply say that a split-coding scheme is (λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-sim-secure if there exists a negligible function negl and a constant γ < α/λ 0 − 1 such that the scheme is (λ 0 , λ 1 , negl)-FLR-simsecure with slack parameter γ.
In Appendix A we recall the game-based definition of [DDV10] and we prove formally that it implies FLR-sim-security for λ 0 = 0.
Impossibility Results
In this section we show the main result of this paper. Throughout the section we let the class of leakage functions be Λ = P /poly . We prove that (α, β)-split-coding schemes that are (λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-sim-secure don't exist for many interesting parameters of α, β, λ 0 and λ 1 . We start with the case α(κ) = Ω(κ), the impossibility results holds under the only assumption that collision resistant hash function exists. For the case α(κ) = O(1), the impossibility results holds under the stronger assumption that adaptive-secure PAoK exists. Theorem 1. If public-coin AoK 1/2,negl(κ) (O(1), AoK (κ)) for NP and collision-resistant hash functions with output length CRH (κ) exist then for any λ 0 AoK (κ) + 2 · CRH (κ) for any γ 0 and for any (α, β)-split-coding scheme Σ with α(κ) λ 0 (κ) · (1 + γ) + CRH (κ) + 7 and if λ 1 (κ) 17λ 0 (κ) · (1 + γ) · AoK (κ) then Σ is not (λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-sim-secure.
Proof. We first set some necessary notation. Given a random variable x we use the notationx to refer to a possible assignment of the random variable. Let (Gen CRH , Eval CRH ) be a collision resistant hash function with output length CRH (κ).
Leakage-aided Prover. Let Π = (Prove, Judge) be in AoK 1/2,negl(κ) (O(1), AoK (κ)) and a public-coin argument system for NP. For concreteness let ρ be the round complexity of the Π. We say that an attacker leaks an argument of knowledge for x ∈ L R from X ∈ {rand, L, R} if the attacker proceeds with the following sequence of instructions and leakage-oracle queries:
-Let r p be a random string long enough to specify all random choices done by the prover of Π. For j ∈ [ρ] do the following: 1. Sample a random string y j ←$ {0, 1} κ ; 2. Send the query X, Prove( x, ·, y 1 , . . . , y j ; r p ) and let z j be the answer to such query. -Let π := y 1 , . . . , y ρ , z 1 , . . . , z ρ be the leaked transcript, compute the value j := Judge x, π , if j = 1 we say that the leaked argument of knowledge is accepting.
Consider the adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) that does the following: This ends the code of A 0 , formally, A 0 (1 κ ) outputs m that is forwarded to the experiment which instantiates a leakage oracle O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) , also A 0 (1 κ ) outputs the state st := (h, h(m)). Here starts the code of Send the query (rand, f 0 ). Let (h l , h r ) be the answer to the query.
Leak Argument of Knowledge of Consistency. Consider the following relation:
Leak an argument of knowledge for (crs, h l , h r , h(m)) ∈ L R st from rand. Notice that a witness for the instance can be defined as function of (ω m). If the leaked argument is not accepting then abort. Let π 0 be the leaked transcript. 6. Send the message encode. 7. Leak Arguments of Knowledge of the Left part. Consider the following relation: 
Proof. Consider the experiment E which is the same as E except that the predictor's input is h (instead of (h, h(m))). We apply Lemma 1:
Consider the experiment E which is the same as E except that the predictor's oracle access to O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) is removed. We apply Lemma 1:
In the last experiment E the predictor has no information about m and moreover h is independently chosen with respect to m, therefore:
Proof. Assume that Σ is an (λ 0 , λ 1 , )-FLR-sim-secure split-coding scheme for a negligible function and a slack parameter γ. Since A is ppt there exists a ppt simulator S such that:
For the sake of the proof we first build a predictor which tries to guess m. We then use this predictor to prove the lemma. Let K be the extractor given by the knowledge soundness property of the argument of knowledge for the relation R hash . Consider the following predictor B that takes as input (h, h(m)) and has oracle access to O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) :
1. Pick two random tapes r a , r s for the adversary A 1 and the simulator S and run both of them (with the respective randomness r a , r s ) forwarding all the queries from A 1 to S and from S to O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) . (The adversary A 1 starts by leaking the values h l , h r and an argument of knowledge for (h l , h r ) ∈ L R st . Eventually the adversary sends the message encode.) 2.L. Extract (h l , L ) ∈ R hash using the knowledge extractor K. For any i ∈ [τ ], letst L i be the actual internal state of S during the above run of S and A 1 just before the i-th iteration of step 7 of A 1 .
Let P leak be a prover of Π for R hash that upon input the instance h l , randomness r p and auxiliary inputst L i does the following: -Run an new instance S i of S with the internal state set tost L i . -Upon message y j with j ∈ [ρ] from the verifier, send to S i the message (L, Prove(h l , ·, y 1 , . . . , y j ), r p ).
-Upon message (msg, f ) from the simulator S i reply ⊥ to S i . Notice that P leak makes no leakage oracle queries.
i) If the value L is unset, run the knowledge extractor K on the prover P S i leak on input h l and auxiliary input st L i and proper randomness 1 . The knowledge extractor K outputs a value L or aborts. If h l = h(L ) then set L otherwise we say that the i-th extraction aborts. ii) Keep on running A 1 and S as in the simulated experiment until reaching the next iteration.
If all the extractions abort, the predictor aborts. 2.R. Extract (h r , R ) ∈ R hash using the knowledge extractor K. The procedure is the same as step 2.L of the predictor, for notational completeness let us denote with st R i the internal state of S just before the i-th iteration of step 8. 3. The predictor outputs m := Dec(L , R ) as its own guess.
We compute the probability that B predicts m correctly. We set up some useful notation:
-Let Ext L (resp. Ext R ) be the event that K successfully extracts a value L (resp. R ). Recall that m := Dec(L , R ) is the guess of B. We can easily derive that:
In fact, Ext L and Ext R imply that L and R are well defined and the event (CohSt ∧ ¬Coll) implies that Dec(L , R ) = m.
Proof. Consider the execution of step 7 between the adversary and the simulator. Letst =st L 1 , . . . ,st L τ ∈ {0, 1} * be a fixed observed value of the states of S in the different rounds, i.e.,st L i is the observed state of S just before the i-th iteration in step 7.
We define a probability Free L (st L i ) of the simulator not asking a leakage query in round i, i.e., the probability that the simulator queries its leakage oracle if run with fresh randomness starting in round i. We can assume without loss of generality that the randomness r s of the simulator is part ofst L i . Therefore the probability is taken over just the randomness r a of the adversary, m, h and the challenges used in the proof in round i. Notice that even though it might be fixed inst =st L 1 , . . . ,st L τ whether or not the simulator leaked in round i (this information might be contained in the final statest L τ ), the probability Free L (st L i ) might not be 0 or 1, as it is the probability that the simulator leaked in round i if we would rerun round i with fresh randomness of the adversary consistent withst L i . and which is 0 otherwise. 2 After having defined Good(st) relative to a fixed observed sequence of states, we now apply it to the random variable st describing the states of S in a random run. When applied to this random variable, we write Good. We can use the law of total probability to condition the extraction event to the event {Good = 1}:
We will now focus on bounding Pr[Ext L |Good = 1] · Pr[Good = 1]. We first bound Pr[Good = 1] and then bound Pr[Ext L |Good = 1].
We first prove that
Too see this notice that the simulator by the rules of the experiment never queries its leakage oracle in more than λ 0 · (1 + γ) rounds: it is not allowed to leak more than λ 0 · (1 + γ) bits and each leakage query counts as at least one bit. Therefore there are at least τ −λ 0 ·(1+γ) rounds in which the simulator did not query its oracle. If Good = 0, then in each of these rounds the probability of leaking, before the round was executed, was at least 1 4 and hence the probability of not leaking was at most 3 4 . Set λ := λ · (1 + γ), we can use a union bound to bound the probability of observing this event
We now use that τ = 17λ 0 · (1 + γ) = 17λ and that it holds for any constant c ∈ (0, 1) that lim n→∞ n cn = 2 H 2 (c)·n , where H 2 is the binary entropy function. We get that
We now bound Pr[Ext L |Good = 1]. Let Ext L (i) be the event that K successfully extracts the value L at the i-th iteration of the step 7 of the adversary A . Let Accept L (i) be the event that P leak on input h l and auxiliary input st L i gives an accepting proof. It follows from knowledge soundness of Π that Pr Ext L (i)|Good = 1 Pr Accept L (i)|Good = 1] − 1 2 .
Let Leak L (i) be the event that the simulator queries its leakage oracle in round i. It holds for all i that
To see this assume that P leak upon message (msg, f ) from S i would send to the simulator f (ω m) instead of ⊥. In that case it gives an acceptable proof with probability 1 − negl(κ) as the adversary leaks an acceptable proof in the real world and the simulator simulates the real world up to negligible difference. Furthermore, sending ⊥ when the simulator queries its oracle can only make a difference when it actually sends a query, which happens with probability Pr[Leak L (i)]
Combining the above inequalities we get that
When Good = 1 there exists some round i * such that
which implies that
Clearly Ext L (i * ) implies Ext L , so we conclude that Pr Ext L |Good = 1
The proof proceeds similar to the proof of the last claim, therefore it is omitted. The reason why the condition Ext L does not matter is that the proof exploits only the knowledge soundness of the proof system. Whether the extraction of the of the left part succeeded or not does not remove the knowledge soundness of the proofs for the right part, as they are done after the proofs for the left part.
Proof. We reduce to the collision resistance property of h and the knowledge soundness of the argument system Π. Suppose that
Consider the following collision finder adversary B coll (h): which can be simulated by B coll (h). 3. Let L , R be as defined by the execution of the predictor B and let r a , r s be the same randomness picked by B in its step 1. Simulate an execution of A 1 (h, h(m); r a ) and S (1 κ ; r s ) and break them just before the adversary leaks an argument of knowledge for R st . Let st be the internal state of S (1 κ ; r s ).
Let P leak be a prover for Π for the relation R st that upon input the instance (crs, h(L ), h(R ), h(m)) and auxiliary input z := (st , m) does the following: -Run an S with the internal state set to st . Sample a random string r p long enough to specify all random choices done by the prover of Π. -Upon message y j with j ∈ [ρ] from the verifier, send to S the message (rand, Prove((crs, h(L ), h(R ), h(m)), En (The next-message function of the prover of Π that uses as input the witness Enc(crs, m; ω) and the internal randomness set to r p .) -Upon message (msg, f ) from the simulator S reply forwarding f (m). It is easy to check that B coll simulates perfectly the randomized experiment E. Therefore:
On the other hand, the extractor K st succeeds with probability at least 1 − negl(κ) − 1 2 . Therefore, L and R are such that h(L ) = h(L ), h(R ) = h(R ) and h(Dec(L , R )) = h(m).
Combining the latter and the statement of the event in Eq. (5), we have h(Dec(L , R )) = h(m) = h(Dec(L , R )) which implies that either L = L or R = R . Lastly, notice that B coll is an expected polynomial time algorithm. However we can make it polynomial time by aborting if the number of step exceeds some fixed polynomial. By setting the polynomial big enough the probability of B coll finding a collision is still noticeable.
Recall that Coll is the event that h(m) = h(m ) but m = m . It can be easily verified that under collision resistance of h the claim holds, therefore the proof is omitted.
Summarizing, we have:
which implies the statement of the lemma.
We conclude the proof of the theorem noticing that, if Σ is (λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-sim-secure split-coding scheme by the parameter given in the statement of the theorem we have that Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are in contraction.
Remark 1. The result can be generalized for a weaker version of the split-state model where the codeword is split in many parts. The probability that the predictor in Lemma 4 guesses the message m degrades exponentially in the number of splits (the adversary needs to leak one hash for each split and then executes step 7 for any split). Therefore, the impossibility holds when the number of splits is o((α − λ 0 (1 + γ))/ CRH ). We present the theorem, as stated here, for sake of simplicity.
The case of constant-size message
Theorem 2. If public-coin AoK 1/2,negl(κ) (O(1), AoK (κ)) for NP, Predictable ZAP for NP with answer length 1 and collision-resistant hash functions with output length CRH (κ) exist then for any λ 0 1 for any γ 0 and for any (α, β)-split-coding scheme Σ with α(κ) 7 + γ and if λ 1 (κ) 17λ 0 (κ) · (1 + γ)) · AoK (κ) + 2 CRH (κ) it holds that Σ is not (λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-sim-secure.
In what follows we give a sketch of the proof of Theorem 2 stressing mainly on the main differences with the proof of Theorem 1. The formal proof is given in Appendix B.
Proof (Sketch.). Consider the adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) which is the same as that of Theorem 1 but steps 4, 5 and 6 are substituted by the following: Send the query (rand, f 0 ). Let lk 0 be the answer to the query. 5. Send the message encode. 6. Leak Hashed Values and Verify Consistency. Send the queries (L, h), (R, h). Let h l , h r be the answers to the queries. Check if Predict(tp, (h l , h r , m)) = lk 0 , abort if not.
Consider the following randomized experiment E:
-Pick uniformly random m ←$ M and h ←$ Gen CRH (1 κ ) and forward to the predictor the value h.
-Instantiate an oracle O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) and give the predictor access to it.
The only difference from Lemma 3 is that the experiment E does not feed the predictor with the value h(m).
The proof of the lemma follows the same line of Lemma 4. Notice that in the experiment E the predictor does not get input m (which it is trying to predict!), so it cannot fully emulate the adversary A , therefore we consider an adversary A which is equivalent to A but does not check that Predict(tp, (crs, h l , h r , m)) = lk 0 (in the case the condition holds we say that lk 0 is valid). The predictor, similar to Lemma 4, simulates the interactions between A and S (the simulator for A ) and then extracts the values L and R.
Notice that the description of the leakage function f 0 is independent of the message m as provided by the syntax of Predictable ZAP and, conditioned on lk 0 is valid, the interactions between A and S and the interactions between A and S are indistinguishable. Moreover, the event happens with overwhelming probability.
Feasibility Results
In this section we give two feasibility results for weaker models of security.
The Inner-Product Extractor is a NC 0 -Fully LR Code
We start by giving a well-known characterization of the class NC 0 . The lemma above shows that any function in NC 0 with output length m such that m(n)/n = ω(1) cannot be collision resistant, because an adversary can guess an index i / ∈ {i 1 , . . . , i c } and output 0 n , (0 i−1 1 0 n−i ) as collision.
Let F be a finite field and let Φ n F = (Enc, Dec) be as follows: -Enc on input m ∈ F picks uniformly random L, R ←$ F n under the condition that L, R = m.
-Dec on input L, R outputs L, R .
Theorem 3 (from [DF11] ). The encoding scheme Φ n F as defined above for |F| = Ω(κ) is a (0, 0.3·|F n |)-FLR-SIM-secure for n > 20.
We will show now that the scheme is also fully leakage resilient for NC 0 -bounded adversaries.
Theorem 4. For any n ∈ N and n > 20 there exists a positive constant δ ∈ R such that, for any λ 0 , λ 1 such that δ · λ 0 + λ 1 < 0.3 · |F n | the encoding scheme Φ n F is (NC 0 , λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-SIM-secure. Proof. Given a vector X ∈ F n let bit(X) i be the i-th bit of a canonical bit-representation of X. Given A = (A 0 , A 1 ) we define a new adversary A that works as follows: 0. Instantiate an execution of (m, st) ←$ A 0 (1 κ ); 1. Execute A 1 (st) and reply to the leakage oracle queries it makes as follow:
- 
Let S be the simulator for the adversary A as provided by Theorem 3, thus:
Let S be defined as the machine that runs the adversary A interacting with the simulator S . Notice that:
This conclude the proof of the theorem.
Remark 2. The proof exploits only marginally the structure of Φ n F . It is not hard to see that the theorem can be generalized for any coding scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) where for any message m ∈ M the function Enc(m; ·) is invertible in NC 0 . We present the theorem, as stated here, only for sake of concreteness.
Remark 3. The construction is secure under the slightly stronger definition where the adversary does not lose access to O ω m λ 0 after having sent the message encode.
A Compiler from LRC to weak FLRC.
Given a (α, β)-split-coding scheme Σ = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with randomness space R, let H r,t denote a family of efficiently computable t-wise independent hash function with domain {0, 1} r and co-domain R.
We define Σ = (Gen , Enc , Dec := Dec) as follow:
-Gen on input 1 κ executes crs ←$ Gen(1 κ ) and samples a function h ←$ H r,t . It outputs crs = (h, crs). -Enc on input a message m ∈ M and (h, crs) picks a random string ω ←$ {0, 1} r and returns as output Enc(crs, m; h(ω)).
Theorem 5. For any encoding scheme Σ and any leakage class F, if Σ is (0, λ 1 , )-FLR-SIM-secure then Σ is (F, λ 0 , λ 1 , 3 )-FLR-SIM-secure for any 0 λ 0 < α whenever: r λ 0 + λ 1 + 2 log(1/ ) + log(t) + 3, t λ 0 · log |F| + α + λ 0 + λ 1 + 2 log(1/ ).
Proof.
Given an adversary A against Σ , we define a ppt adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) against Σ as follow:
-Adversary A 0 : On input crs, it picks at random h ←$ H r,t , a random string ω ←$ {0, 1} r and a random string r ←$ {0, 1} p(κ) for a polynomial p that bounds the running time of A and runs A 0 (1 κ ; r).
Upon leakage oracle query f to O ω λ 0 from A 0 , it replies f (ω). Eventually, the adversary A 0 outputs a a message m ∈ M and a state value st, A 0 outputs m and st = (st, h).
-Adversary A 1 : On inputs st = (st, h) and crs, it runs A 1 (st, (h, crs) ) and forwards all the queries made by A 1 .
W.l.o.g. the adversary A 0 makes the sequence (rand, f 1 ), (rand, f 2 ), . . . , (rand, f λ 0 ) of queries. Let f := (f 1 , . . . , f λ 0 ) ∈ F λ 0 , therefore view of A in the real experiment is:
On the other hand, by definition of the adversary A, the view provided to A is:
where L , R = Enc(crs, m; ω ) and ω ←$ {0, 1} r and ω ←$ R.
Claim 5 Real λ 0 ,λ 1 A ,Σ (κ) κ∈N ≈ 2 (κ) Hyb(κ) κ∈N . Before proceeding with the proof of the claim we show how the theorem follows. Let S be the simulator for the adversary A as given by the hypothesis of the theorem:
Let S be defined as the adversary A interacting with the simulator S. Therefore, if we consider Ideal 0,λ 1 A,S (κ) = (r, h, ω), crs, lk L , lk R , it holds that:
It follows from a simple reduction to Eq. (6) that:
We conclude by applying Claim 5 to equation above.
Proof (of the claim). Since we are proving statistical closeness we can de-randomize the adversary A by setting the random string that maximize the distinguishability of the two random variables. Similarly we can de-randomize the common reference string generation algorithm Gen. Therefore, w.l.o.g., we can consider them fixed in the views. Recall that the adversary A defines for A a hybrid environment where the leakage on the randomness is on ω ←$ {0, 1} r but the codeword is instantiated using fresh randomness ω ←$ R. We prove the stronger statement that the two views are statistical close with high probability over the choice of the t-wise hash function h. For convenience, we define two tuples of random variables: Pr
where Eq. (7) follows by Lemma 2 and Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) follow because 2 r ·p v 2 r−λ t. Combining all together we have:
To make the above negligible we can set: r λ 0 + λ 1 + 2 log(1/ ) + log(t) + 3, t λ 0 · log |F| + α + λ 0 + λ 1 + 2 log 1/ .
B Proof of Theorem 2.
We give the definition of Predictable ZAPs from [FNV15] .
Definition 6 (Predictable ZAP). Let Π = (Chall, Resp, Predict) and let R be an NP relation. Consider the properties below.
Completeness: There exists a negligible function ν : N → [0, 1] such that for all (x, w) ∈ R:
(Adaptive) Knowledge soundness with error : For all ppt provers P * making polynomially many queries to its oracle, there exists a ppt extractor K and a non-zero polynomial q(·) such that for any auxiliary input z ∈ {0, 1} * the following holds. Whenever
In the above equations, we denote by V(1 κ , tp, ·, ·) the oracle machine that upon input a query (x, a) computes b := Predict(1 κ , tp, x) and outputs 1 iff a = b; we also write Q for the list {(x i , a i ), d i )} of oracle queries (and answers to these queries) made by P * .
Consider the adversary A that executes the same code of A but, in step 6, does not check that Predict(tp, (h l , h r , m)) = lk 0 . Notice that we can implement A 1 without providing the input m. We have that:
In fact, conditioned on the event {Predict(tp, (h l , h r , m)) = lk 0 } the two distributions are exactly the same. On the other hand, Eq. (12) implies that the event happens with probability 1 − negl(κ) − (κ) (where the negligible factor negl comes from the completeness of the PZAP).
For the sake of the proof we first build a predictor which is given h and tries to guess m. We then use this predictor to prove the lemma. Let K be the extractor given by the knowledge soundness property of the argument of knowledge for the relation R hash . Consider the following predictor B that takes as input h and has oracle access to O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) :
1. Pick two random tapes r a , r s for the adversary A 1 and the simulator S and run both of them (with the respective randomness r a , r s ) connecting the oracle accesses of A to the interfaces of S and forwarding the queries of S to the oracle O m λ 0 ·(1+γ) . (The adversary A 1 starts by leaking a PZAP for R st , then it sends the message encode and leaks the values h l , h r from O L λ 1 , O R λ 1 .) 2.L. Extract (h l , L ) ∈ R hash using the knowledge extractor K. For any i ∈ [τ ], letst L i be the actual internal state of S during the above run of S and A 1 just before the i-th iteration of step 7 of A 1 .
Let P leak be a prover of Π for R hash that upon input the instance h l , randomness r p and auxiliary inputst L i does the following: -Run an new instance S i of S with the internal state set tost L i . -Upon message y j with j ∈ [ρ] from the verifier, send to S i the message (L, Prove(h l , ·, y 1 , . . . , y j ); r p ).
-Upon message (msg, f ) from the simulator S i reply forwarding ⊥ to S i . Notice that P leak makes no leakage oracle queries. i) If the value L is unset, run the knowledge extractor K on the prover P S i leak on input h l and auxiliary input st L i and proper randomness. The knowledge extractor K outputs a value L or aborts. If h l = h(L ) then set L otherwise we say that the i-th extraction aborts. ii) Keep on running A 1 and S as in the simulated experiment until reach the next iteration.
If all the extractions abort, the predictor aborts. 2.R. Extract (h r , R ) ∈ R hash using the knowledge extractor K. The procedure is the same of step 2.L of the predictor, for notational completeness let us denote with st R i the internal state of S just before the i-th iteration of step 8. 3. The predictor outputs m := Dec(L , R ) as its own guess.
-Let Ext L (resp. Ext R ) be the event that K successfully extracts a value L (resp. R ). The proof proceeds similar to the proof of the correspondent lemmas in the proof of Theorem 1, therefore it is omitted. -Consider the following prover P * :
1. Let r a , r s be the same randomness picked by B in its step 1; 2. Simulate an execution of A 1 (m, h; r a ) and S (1 κ ; r s ): -The adversary sends (rand, f 0 ) as defined in Eq. (11), let lk 0 be the answer given by the simulator. The simulator possibly send messages of the form (msg, f ) reply with f (m); -Continue the execution of A 1 (h; r a ) and S (1 κ ; r s ) until A 1 has leaked the value h l and h r ; 3. Output (crs, h l , h r , m) as instance and lk 0 as answer. Run the knowledge extractor K given by the definition of PZAP for the adversary P * , specifically we run K on the same randomness and auxiliary input of P * . Let L , R the witness output by the extractor.
-If L = L output (L , L ) else (R , R ).
It is easy to check that B coll simulates perfectly the randomized experiment E therefore: On the other hand, the extractor K succeeds with probability at least q(1 − negl(κ) − 1 2 ) − negl(κ). Notice that the definition of PAoK implies that the probability of K extracting and P * succeeding are related, however, in general the instance for which the two algorithm wins the games can be different. This is not a problem for us, since P * wins with overwhelming probability, therefore the ratio of the intersection of the instances for which both K extracts and P * succeeds is negligible close to the set of instance for which K extracts, this explain why we lose an extra negl factor. Therefore, L and R are such that h(L ) = h(L ), h(R ) = h(R ) and Dec(L , R ) = m. The latter implies Dec(L , R ) = Dec(L , R ) which implies that either L = L or R = R . Lastly, notice that B coll is an expected polynomial time algorithm, however we can make it polynomial time by aborting if the number of steps exceed some fixed polynomial. By setting the polynomial big enough the probability of B coll finding a collision is still noticeable.
Summarizing, we have:
Pr[m = m] = Pr Ext L ∧ Ext R ∧ CohSt which implies the statement of the lemma.
We conclude the proof of the theorem noticing that if Σ is (λ 0 , λ 1 )-FLR-sim-secure split-coding scheme by the parameter given in the statement of the theorem we have that Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 are in contraction.
